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Mr. Barrett called upon General Magruder for his estimate of the current situation with respect to Chinese intervention in Korea. General Magruder replied that it was far from clear what the Chinese were up to and that he, personally, had the feeling that we still have the possibility of doing something with the Chinese, that they were not working within the framework of a Soviet plan, and were not actually anti-U.S. He felt that we should continue intensify our efforts to influence the Chinese by propaganda and other psychological means.

Mr. Wisner asked whether we were devoting appropriate attention to Chinese groups in this country. This led to general discussion of the question of governmental and non-governmental efforts to influence foreign nationality groups in this country.

The Acting Executive Secretary reported that he had an appointment the next day with Mr. McCordick of the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs on the subject of U.S. propaganda and psychological warfare, and requested instructions as to how far he should go in disclosures. It was agreed nothing should be imparted about the state of psychological warfare planning for wartime, in view of the lack of agreements, but that it was in order to discuss other matters with him of a classification up to and including confidential.

Mr. Berding returned to the question of the suggested Eisenhower visit to Europe and asked what its status was. General McClure indicated that there was some question as to the advisability of the visit among planning officials in Defense. Mr. Barrett pointed out that the original purpose of the proposed visit was to bolster morale in Western Europe, and inspire confidence, not so much among the governments of Western Europe as among the people. In this sense he felt that General Eisenhower had a considerable symbolic importance.

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Mr. Barrett brought up the following matters:

1. The question of terminology in characterizing the Russians in speeches and general propaganda output.
2. The question of how to handle in propaganda output to Europe news about U.S. defensive preparations, with particular reference to the problem of whether such news would serve to reassure European populations or give them the fear that we were preparing for war.

Following a general discussion, it was agreed that in any event "the less said about the A Bomb, the better."

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